Ethiopian agreement what is it?

Addis Ababa agreement and the issue of war and peace 10-05-2012 02:43 AM D. Shafie Khader Said Read in the political landscape Addis Ababa agreement and the issue of war and peace *** Agreement the two main unresolved issues most complex and occupy top priority, any border and Abyei. Instead, fought Convention in details can not predict could be achieved only if resolving these issues comes 1) welcomed everyone, including us, the Addis Ababa agreement signed by Presidents Bashir and Kiir on 27 September 2012. And welcoming stems from several considerations most important, that the agreement represents a necessary step in the direction of defusing the war and confrontation between the two countries, and opens a new page to normalize their relations for the benefit of their peoples, and confirms that continued dialogue and negotiation, not war and strife, can find solutions satisfactory to all outstanding issues and disputed. This is what we have been manifest in all forums and events since it emerged as a result of the referendum and became the secession of the south is a reality. I think it would be useful to summarize headlines highlighted what has been agreed and signed by the two presidents, which included: - Reaffirming a commitment to the decision of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union issued on April 24, 2012, and is included in the UN Security Council Resolution No. 2046 dated May 2, 2012, and certainly in the statement issued by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on 3 August 2012. It is important to note that all these decisions adopted the Addis Ababa Framework Agreement signed between the d. Nafie and Mr. Malik Agar in June 2011, which was canceled by the government of Sudan from one side. - Commitment to work and cooperate together in order to build two capable of survival and coexistence with each other and with neighboring countries, and from the fact eternal and historical ties between the two countries. - Comply with all stated in the Charter of the African Union (AU) and the UN Charter on the relations between states, and respect for the principle of national sovereignty of each country. - Commitment to the implementation of a number of agreements signed by the two parties, which include: the joint paper on security arrangements (7 December 2010), the joint paper on border security (30 May 2011), Concord Kadugli on supporting the task of monitoring the border (8 August 2011), Interim arrangements regarding the security and management of Abyei (June 20, 2011, border security and political mechanism common security (29 June 2011), another agreement on support for the task of monitoring the border (30 July 2011), a memorandum of understanding on cooperation and cessation of hostilities (10 February 2012), the formation of the Commission competent (23 June 2012), and the recent agreement on security arrangements (26 September 2012). - Commitment to implement what has been agreed upon by the parties in the recent agreement, signed by the Co-Bashir and Salva Kiir, which includes: oil and economic issues associated with it, freedoms four, banking cooperation, trade between the two countries, assets and property and to work together towards the international community, pensions and benefits after service and security arrangements. - The two sides also agreed to continue negotiations on the disputed border issues and Abyei, and complete implementation of all the remaining issues of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement as well as the post-secession issues. 2) it is necessary to refer to some key observations that have important political implications, and associated with the issue of war and peace in Sudan, First: The public reaction to the agreement generally positive, masses expect that reflected the agreement to alleviate the suffering of everyday life in a country Nhishh inflation and economic decline. Second: the agreement has been under pressure and threats, the international and regional levels, a feature seems it Stlazem any negotiation with the rescue. But, what concerns us here is that the experience, including the Naivasha and Abuja agreements, explained that the bilateral agreements, which are under pressure from the international community, often accompanied by implementation erupted a number of ticking time bombs. Third: the Convention has not resolved the two main issues the most complex and occupy top priority, any border and Abyei. Instead, fought Convention in details can not predict could be achieved only if comes to resolve these issues. So perhaps what happened agreement as ammonia Sprinkle Tfoik and continue ruling throwing money in the coffers ...., but it is also a powerful incentive to push the children of the people to stand firm barrier against the war and against hunger and poverty and against the fragmentation of the country. Fourth: It is true that the SPLM / North welcomed the Convention, and stressed welcomed any subsequent agreements lead to normalization of the relationship between Sudan and South Sudan, but noted, rightly, that the Convention and the top two presidents failed to address the humanitarian situation dire in the regions of Southern Blue Nile and South Kordofan , also did not discuss obstacles to the implementation of the tripartite agreement to begin humanitarian operations. And also indicated the SPLM / north to the Khartoum government's refusal to negotiate with them in accordance with Security Council Resolution 2046 and the Agreement of 28 June 2011 Framework provided later in the Security Council resolution. Fifth: أعتفد that any talk or agreement between the two countries on a demilitarized zone between the border, does not make sense if it includes an agreement with the SPLM / North, which is active militarily in this region, which emphasizes control over nearly 40% of Sudan's border with South Sudan in the areas of Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains. The agreement generally focused on economic issues outstanding between the two countries rather than on policy-related issues hostilities in South Kordofan and the Blue Nile and understanding with the SPLM / North. 3) revealed the Convention on the depth contradictions of the political scene in Sudan: the government and its various departments, in control of the backbone of the day-to-day political life, stands out and produce every day new blocks rival. And Oeetm portray the conflict rescue these blocs as a motive for the movement of the political conflict in the country, and the region in general. A conflict that easily caught, while difficult Ranked. Holders of conflicting blocs usually share their sites for personal reasons mostly do not care about the citizen in the daily misery. And, of course, is not related to conflicts of living nor the interests of the poor and marginalized, as far as they are concerned the stability of the conditions that allow for the personal aspirations of power and wealth, expansion and slander. After the agreement, reached the end bickering contradiction, and at the highest levels: war called him with hateful racist premise refuse Convention, and other supporters of the Convention are not enemies of the war initially as much as they are affected by their effects, or the beneficiaries of the gains of the Convention directly. On the other hand, the contrast between the reaction in Juba and the reaction in Khartoum, not Balstahi or simple. The Sudan government financial and political crisis not Birha that doubling of the beauties of the Convention or conceived as unparalleled achievement. Perhaps it was an attempt to send a signal says it is still supported by the masses, and by signing the Convention, fact Tlabebha of the grip of the international community, especially since it received the blessing and immediate praise from the United States. In the state just emerging in the south, everyone angry reaction confirms that it needs to re-evaluate and concrete attempts to improve the relationship between the two countries, by targeting the grassroots level more than the official level. The stakeholders in the two countries, especially the tribes seek border, and in particular are the sons of the Dinka and the sons of Misseriya in Abyei, Southern Kordofan, are tribes remained symbiotic for hundreds of years, and know thoughts to each other, and a little effort can resolve issues of tension between them, as a matter of Ibeye, especially if We put a set of proposals on alternatives, such as Abyei area integration, and if activists work on initiating projects for the benefit of human development and the region of Abyei, not be seen merely as a cash cow. 4) The cessation of the war in the Southern Blue Nile and South Kordofan and access solutions include all the movements in Darfur, can not be manipulated, Oaltzlam subjecting the atmospheres of the U.S. elections. He added, in terms of preventing the southern government of supporting armed movements, or from the angle of disengagement with Northern Sector, will not create only more tension ... everyone face it from the angle of work to put things in perspective and under the correct address: Sudan and freedom for all, the two not monopoly of the National Congress and only Khalsaúh!. The director of a curse imposed agreements, and that made our country more like putting the state under international Commandments, begins the extension of democracy and the consolidation of its institutions and expand Moainha, and open all doors closed even Tendhr war, corruption and eat people's rights and culture of obedience and submission. This means the change to the era of the Sudan is where all the different ethnicities and cultures and political persuasions Field